I
n the 2009 White Paper Series of the John M. Eisenberg Center for Clinical Decisions and communications, Elwyn and others 1 revisit the issue of patient decision aids (DAs). To summarize, the authors argue that there is a need to consider the aims of these interventions in more depth, which leads them to propose a new definition as well as a classification of interventions into those used by clinicians in face-to-face encounters, those that can be used independently from clinical encounters, and those that are mediated by interactive and social technologies. We appreciate the intention of the authors to start a debate about the aims and types of patient DAs, but we do not see the need for a new definition. And, rather than classifying interventions based solely on their place or mode of administration, we believe there is a need for a theory-based taxonomy of DAs based on a task analysis of the individual-cognitive/affective as well as the socialinteractive process of decision making.
There is no need for a new definition of DAs. The authors start from the original definition of DAs by O'Connor and others 2 (''interventions designed to help people make specific and deliberative choices among options by providing information about the options and outcomes that are relevant to a person's health status'') but prefer to broaden the term to decision support intervention (DeSI 3 ), to recognize that any artifact that attempts to support individuals facing decisions is a patient-orientated DeSI. There are, of course, many ways to support decision making. However, gathering all of these under the umbrella of DAs or, for that matter, DeSIs may only further confuse the field. They mention, for example, risk communication tools, but these can be quite limited, not involving all the ingredients that O'Connor and others 2 ascribed to DAs in the Cochrane definition. Other forms of decision support mentioned, such as telephone coaching by nurses or consultations with nurse navigators, are not simply artifacts but constitute a new form of professional encounter. We risk losing ground when we subsume under DAs-or even DeSIs-anything aimed to support individuals facing tough decisions. Certainly the aim of DAs is to support patients in making decisions, but that is also the aim of many a clinician (if not too paternalistic) in an encounter in which a decision needs to be made. Where do we then draw the line?
The definition by Elwyn and others 1 seems more an elaboration on the definition given by O'Connor and others 2 in the first Cochrane Review. It expands on the original definition's concept of ''deliberative choices,'' particularly on the shorthand ''providing information about the options and outcomes relevant to the patient's health status.'' It specifies one piece of information about these outcomes-namely, information that supports affective forecasting-and it provides more context. As such, it serves as a valuable interpretation of that definition. But all new elements in the proposed new definition may be captured by that widely accepted earlier definition, which is parsimonious, like a good mathematical model. Although one can argue that the design of DAs should go beyond the term provision of information, a definition need not include such specification. Furthermore, not all DAs will have the same goals, and the design of a DA should be tied to the goals the DA is setting out to achieve. 4 Explicitly specifying all the possible ingredients in a definition may hamper the field and runs the risk of discarding useful tools that do not fully fit this specification. We therefore argue that a thoughtful categorization would be more useful. There is a need for a theory-based taxonomy of DAs. Our second concern relates to the categorization, which the authors base on their ''analysis of tasks and roles.'' We believe a categorization of DAs should be based not only on tasks and roles (which we assume refer to aims) but also on various other aspects that are unaccounted for here. Such a categorization requires a more in-depth analysis and at the very least should include the following: whom the tools need to support (an individual or a dyad or even a triad), which deficiencies are to be overcome (limited information-processing capacities, complex social interactions, limited doctor-patient communication), what stage in decision making is addressed (information integration, clarifying values, deliberation), and what context (complexity of the problem, severity of the outcomes, setting). 5 As decision making can be both an individual and often social enterprise, a classification or taxonomy of DAs should be based on a task analysis of the individual cognitive/ affective as well as the social-interactive process of decision making. We therefore argue that the authors' analysis needs to go further. A taxonomy of DAs should take into account the previously mentioned aspects, such as the deficiencies and difficulties of the individual and the social process of decision making. 6 Elwyn and others 1 refer to these difficulties as they discuss the issues of affective forecasting and the construction of preferences (both difficult and prone to bias), but the authors fail to relate this to an analysis of difficulties encountered in the decision-making process. Their discussion of these two topics seems coincidental. Furthermore, they use ''setting'' rather than ''task'' or ''role'' as a basis for a classification and therefore mystify instead of clarify the conceptual framework. Particularly the third category, socially mediated DeSIs, raises questions. Should, for example, nurse telephone coaching be seen as socially mediated? In our view, it fits under the header of an encounter with a professional, just not a face-to-face encounter. Moreover, a major characteristic of social media is user-generated content and, as such, seems less relevant to professionally controlled DAs as discussed by the International Patient Decision Aid Standards (IPDAS) 7 and the Cochrane reviews. 2 Sites such as PatientsLikeMe may provide patients with support, but in our opinion, such sites fall into a classification of ''anything that supports a decision,'' which confuses rather than clarifies the concepts. We agree with the authors that information from these virtual communities may be an important resource for patients, but we disagree with their suggestion to incorporate these as a category of DAs. Incorporating such sites as DAs could legitimize the provision of possibly unreliable evidence to patients. A good alternative for what the authors propose to be the function of such sites, providing narrative information to patients, would be referring patients to sites such as www.healthtalkonline.co.uk.
In the section on ''Adjuncts or Adversaries,'' Elwyn and others 1 worry that DeSIs may discourage shared decision making. This is not the first time these issues have been discussed in this journal. 8, 9 However, the goal of DAs is not necessarily to support shared decision making, even though many aids have been developed to do so. DAs are meant to help patients make good decisions or even just to increase patient involvement. 7, 10 Whether this implies ''shared decision making'' will depend on the context, and indeed a good categorization would incorporate this distinction. For example, Charles and others 4 distinguish paternalistic, shared, and informed decision making as 3 approaches in which DAs may be embedded. A related contextual aspect that may be relevant here is severity of the clinical problem. Charles and others 4 compared a decision about mastectomy with one about hormone replacement therapy, which led them to conclude that some DAs, even for treatment decisions, need not be embedded in the medical encounter. Indeed, DAs embedded in the clinical encounter should not hinder shared decision making, but for some decisions the patient may prefer an informed approach, without doctor input. 4 A related contextual distinction that is relevant here is that between decisions about treatment and decisions about screening or other preventive measures. Screening and vaccination are often organized by public health authorities without intervening contact with a physician. DAs then serve to promote autonomous (informed) decision making. We consider this an asset and not an adversary.
Thus, although we agree that a taxonomy would further the field, we believe it should be based on a more thorough analysis of the decision process that needs to be supported.
In conclusion, we believe that there is no need for a new definition, and we argue that a more elaborate conceptual framework is needed and should be used to form the basis of a taxonomy of DAs. The groundwork for this has already been laid in the IPDAS background document, 7 and much can be learned from the conceptual review of Bekker. 6 There cannot be a one-size-fits-all solution to the design and evaluation of DAs or DeSIs. The best course is to aim for a global framework. Categorizing tools along the axes mentioned above (e.g., whom and what to support, stage to be addressed, contextual factors) 5 may result in guidelines for those of the IPDAS standards that each category should adhere to. We further believe that in creating such a framework, we should focus on the tools as originally meant. Diverging into the wider world of decision support mediated using social media will lead only to more confusion. Resolving the important issues of how to support deliberation, preference construction, and affective forecasting 1 is in itself a vast enough task.
